[Grovenet] Fw: The True Price of Oil
Ron D'Eau Claire
ron at cobi.biz
Sat Jul 2 08:02:59 PDT 2005
Hi, David:
You've got to be kidding! This report underscores the breakdown for the
Coast Guard traffic monitoring system in the Sound. The report makes it very
clear that Exxon Valdez was perfectly capable of being where it needed to be
if they had been informed of their navigational error. If Coast Guard had
been watching, there'd have been no grounding and no spill.
The Coast Guard is a great organization filled with great people. But the
system did not work that night at Valdez. Had they done their job, Exxon
might have faced investigation for not requiring two officers on the bridge
at all times, and third mate Cousins (who as a perfectly qualified officer
to be in charge at that time) might have faced questions about how he
allowed the vessel to deviate too far from the normal lanes, but that's
different than having a huge spill.
Indeed, since Third Mate Cousins was the qualified officer in charge
responsible for navigating the ship, I find it curious that the Captain, who
was not on the bridge at the time, was blamed for the errors that occurred
aboard the vessel that resulted in the grounding. It may have worked that
way aboard ships in the 17th Century, but not today.
This report points out that the government agencies had failed to enforce
the rules that were set. Shipping lines like Exxon were getting away with
crowding their limits - and at times breaking the rules - without penalty.
Yes, that's the fault of the business - the shipping line. And it is EQUALLY
the fault of the agencies responsible for enforcing those rules. In this
case the Coast Guard. As the report observed, the rules seem to have been
broken regularly by the companies, and the violations were regularly ignored
by the Coast Guard.
It was a system that had been allowed to get sloppy across the board.
I think it points out that probably the least blame belonged to Captain
Hazelwood. But blaming the Captain pandered to the public perception that
the Captain is "in charge" of everything that goes on aboard his vessel.
That's not true, especially that night in Prince William Sound.
Also note that this is an excellently-written report, but is not unbiased.
It uses inflammatory and non-professional terminology to shift the reader's
perception. One glaring example is the fact that the Exxon Valdez grounded
on Bligh rock. Indeed that phrase is used in one paragraph. But on the topic
sentence of another paragraph they use the highly-charged phrase, "Until the
Exxon Valdez piled onto Bligh Reef..." That's selective editing for effect,
not for conveying balanced information.
Ron D'Eau Claire
-----Original Message-----
From: David Morelli [mailto:jo.david at verizon.net]
Sent: Saturday, July 02, 2005 12:26 AM
To: ron at cobi.biz; Forest Grove local interests list
Subject: Re: [Grovenet] Fw: The True Price of Oil
Ron,
I apologize for taking so long to locate this copy of the events
leading to the grounding of the Exxon Valdez.
It would appear that the tanker captain asked for and received
permission to travel outbound in the empty inbound lane, he took it
upon himself to leave the official traffic lanes to avoid sea ice. It
would appear that the ship left the authorized travel lanes while the
captain was still on the bridge. It would appear that after telling
the Coast Guard that he was reducing the rpm of the screw, he increased
rpm. It would appear that his passage out of deep water was not
motivated by the local fishermen but by the conditions of sea ice. It
would appear that he set a course for the reef and left the helm to an
officer who had been awake for 18 hours and after 6 hours on watch was
due for watch relief. After grounding, the captain tried to get the
ship off of the reef for fifteen minutes and then USCG was notified of
the grounding 20 minutes after the fact. After notifying the USCG of
the grounding, the captain again tried for an hour to work the ship
free, and forty minutes of that time was after the crew reported that
the ship's computer program indicated that the ship had exceeded
acceptable stress limits and needed to stay on the reef for stability
reasons.
All of that suggests that trying to lay the blame on the Coast Guard,
is not warranted.
David
Quotes from:
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/facts/details.html
<quote>
At 11:25 p.m. Hazelwood informed the Vessel Traffic Center that the
pilot had departed and that he was increasing speed to sea speed. He
also reported that "judging, ah, by our radar, we'll probably divert
from the TSS [traffic separation scheme] and end up in the inbound lane
if there is no conflicting traffic." The traffic center
indicated concurrence, stating there was no reported traffic in the
inbound lane. ... At no time did the Exxon Valdez report or seek
permission to depart farther east from the inbound traffic lane; but
that is exactly what it did.
At 11:30 p.m. Hazelwood informed the Valdez traffic center that he was
turning the ship toward the east on a heading of 200 degrees and
reducing speed to "wind my way through the ice" (engine logs, however,
show the vessel's speed continued to increase). At 11: 39 Cousins
plotted a fix that showed the ship in the middle of the
traffic separation scheme. Hazelwood ordered a further course change to
a heading of 180 degrees (due south) and, according to the helmsman,
directed that the ship be placed on autopilot. The second course change
was not reported to the Valdez traffic center. For a total of 19 or 20
minutes the ship sailed south-through the inbound traffic lane, then
across its easterly boundary and on toward its peril at Bligh Reef.
Traveling at approximately 12 knots, the Exxon Valdez crossed the
traffic lanes' easterly boundary at 11:47 p.m.
At 11:52 p.m. the command was given to place the ship's engine on "load
program up"-a computer program that, over a span of 43 minutes, would
increase engine speed from 55 RPM to sea speed full ahead at 78.7 RPM.
After conferring with Cousins about where and how to return the ship to
its designated traffic lane, Hazelwood left the bridge. The time,
according to NTSB testimony, was approximately 11:53 p.m.
By this time Third Mate Cousins had been on duty for six hours and was
scheduled to be relieved by Second Mate Lloyd LeCain. ... Cousins did
not call LeCain to awaken him for the midnight-to-4-a.m. watch, instead
remaining on duty himself. Cousins was the only officer on the
bridge-a situation that violated company policy and perhaps contributed
to the accident. ...
The grounding, described by helmsman Robert Kagan as "a bumpy ride" and
by Cousins as six "very sharp jolts," occurred at 12:04 a.m. ... After
feeling the grounding Hazelwood rushed to the bridge, arriving as
the ship came to rest. He immediately gave a series of rudder orders in
an attempt to free the vessel, and power to the ship's engine remained
in the "load program up" condition for about 15 minutes after impact.
Chief Mate Kunkel went to the engine control room and
determined that eight cargo tanks and two ballast tanks had been
ruptured; he concluded the cargo tanks had lost an average of 10 feet
of cargo, with approximately 67 feet of cargo remaining in each. He
informed Hazelwood of his initial damage assessment and was instructed
to perform stability and stress analysis. At 12:19 a.m. Hazelwood
ordered that the vessel's engine be reduced to idle speed.
At 12:26 a.m., Hazelwood radioed the Valdez traffic center and reported
his predicament to Bruce Blandford, a civilian employee of the Coast
Guard who was on duty. "We've fetched up, ah, hard aground, north of
Goose Island, off Bligh Reef and, ah, evidently leaking some oil and
we're gonna be here for a while and, ah, if you want, ah, so you're
notified." ...
Hazelwood, meanwhile, was not finished with efforts to power the Exxon
Valdez off the reef. At approximately 12:30 a.m., Chief Mate Kunkel
used a computer program to determine that though stress on the vessel
exceeded acceptable limits, the ship still had required stability. He
went to the bridge to advise Hazelwood that the vessel should not go to
sea or leave the area. The skipper directed him to return to the
control room to continue assessing the damage and to determine
available options. At 12:35 p.m., Hazelwood ordered the engine back
on-and eventually to "full ahead"-- and began another series of rudder
commands in an effort to free the vessel. After running his computer
program again another way, Kunkel concluded that the ship did not have
acceptable stability without being supported by the reef. The chief
mate relayed his new analysis to the captain at I a.m. and again
recommended that the ship not leave the area. Nonetheless,
Hazelwood kept the engine running until 1:41 a.m., when he finally
abandoned efforts to get the vessel off the reef.
</quote>
On Saturday, June 25, 2005, at 01:31 PM, Ron D'Eau Claire wrote:
> If the record is complete it was not Capt. Hazelwood who put the Exxon
> Valdez on those rocks. He wasn't even on duty.
>
> Y'see, we are so paranoid about wrecks and spills that the U.S. Coast
> Guard
> takes precedence over the dictates of captains at times. In this case,
> the
> U.S. Coast Guard required the Exxon Valdez take a course the tanker
> captains
> and owners alike hated and protested constantly. They were required to
> sail
> a shallow-water passage that took them close to the rocks.
>
> The big tankers were required to take that course near the rocks
> because the
> fishermen complained that it inconvenienced them to deal with the ships
> passing by out in the deep water of the sound.
>
> But there was no danger, the Coast Guard assured the tankers. The
> Coast Guard station monitored the movement of every ship in the sound,
> and would alert them instantly via VHF two-way "bridge-to-bridge"
> radio if the ship
> deviated even slightly from the proscribed, safe shipping lane. It
> took no
> skill aboard the tanker to navigate her safely. Anyone could do it. The
> Coast Guard would make sure of that.
>
> Except no one was at the radar position at the Coast Guard center that
> night. No on at the Coast Guard facility was even aware of the
> movements of the Exxon Valdez until repeated calls were made to the
> Coast Guard.
>
> So who put the Valdez on the rocks? Captain Hazelwood who was off duty
> and
> asleep? The U.S. Coast Guard who promised that they would monitor the
> ship
> and ensure it did not stray into dangerous waters? The fishermen who
> demanded the tankers take the course near the rocks for their own
> convenience?
>
> It isn't only oil that's expensive.
>
> So is incompetence and lack of accountability.
>
> I worked on a lot of tankers in and around the San Francisco Bay. A
> number
> of men who had sailed for years with Captain Hazelwood swore that if
> they
> ever caught a member of the Coast Guard on deck with no one watching,
> he/she
> was going over the side.
>
> I can't say as I blame them too much for their feelings. Still, I'm
> glad I
> never heard a splash.
>
> Ron D'Eau Claire
>
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: grovenet-bounces at rdrop.com [mailto:grovenet-bounces at rdrop.com]
> On Behalf Of Geri
> Sent: Saturday, June 25, 2005 12:39 PM
> To: GroveNet
> Subject: [Grovenet] Fw: The True Price of Oil
>
>
>
> http://www.alternet.org/module/printversion/22260
>
>
> -~-~-~-
>
>
> Geri
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